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I. OVERVIEW

The April 2, 2002 Federal Circuit opinion in Enzo1 may have the greatest potential
impact on a multidimensional basis of any decision from that court in recent years.
This is a bold statement when one considers the significant impact of its en bane
decisions of the past two years dealing with patent scope. Very important-but
overshadowed by broader concerns-is the potential disruption of a wide scope of
current patent rights that have been keyed to an understanding of patent law that goes
back many years. There are two more important implications of the Enzo opinion.
Macroscopically, far more important than whatever disruption takes place
domestically-which may be fixed through Congressional or further judicial actionone must look to the foreign impact of the Enzo opinion: It threatens to undermine the
patent basis for American protection of biotechnology inventions abroad, once the case
is understood and embodied in the several foreign patent laws.
A special new law is created for biotechnology. But, there is only one patent law
for al] technologies.
Enzo creep that transfers principles of the case to other
technologies provides the potential to undermine both currently evolving areas such as
e-commerce but also the "new light bulb" of the future.
Beyond biotechnology, the creation of a new judicial framework for understanding
the "written description" requirement does violence to the traditional statutory scheme.
The quid pro quo of the patent system is not to provide claims as "technical descriptions
of the disclosed inventions .... -2 As part of the organization of the 1952 Patent Act, the
late Giles Sutherland Rich and his colleagues judicially redrafted the disclosure
requirements in 1970.3 For a decade, the previous standard of "new matter" coexisted
with the "written description" requirement.4
Difficulties in claiming certain types of inventions in words have always been a
5
problem, one that did not start and will not end with biotechnology inventions.
. Paper prepared for presentation to the American Intellectual Property
Law Association
Biotechnology Committee, Special Meeting on the Enzo Case, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York,
April 19, 2002.
Former Director of the Intellectual Property Law Program and Professor
of Law, George
Washington University Law School; Foley & Lardner, Washington, D.C. The views expressed herein
are entirely pro bono and personal to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of any
colleague or client or any organization with which the author is affiliated.
I Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., No. 01-1230, 2002 WL 487156 (Fed. Cir. April 2, 2002)
(Lourie, Dyk, Prost, JJ.; opinion by Lourie, J; dissent by Dyk, J.).
2 In re Vamco Mach. & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also infra Part II
(The Statutory Scheme).
3 DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 21 (2d ed. 2001).
4 [d.
Soo infra Part III (Inventions with Less Than a Word Picture).
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The special problems for biotechnology issues are then addressed.6
The
international patent community and its adoption of the American practice is next
considered. Indeed, an entire treaty system was built around the U.S. system as
7
embodied in the Budapest Treaty.
Problems with Enzo are not limited to biotechnology. What's good for the
biotechnology goose is good for the e-commerce gander.8
Fundamentally, we must address whether the pro-patent philosophy of
9
Chakrabarty
is to be maintained, 10 with all the ramifications for not only existing
patent rights but also for what will happen to the rights of Americans and others in
foreign systems and what will happen for the new technologies of the future. 1

II.

THE STATUTORY SCHEME

A. Section 112 of the 1952 PatentAct
Dating back to the nineteenth century there have been several different but
related statutory requirements for defining and supporting an invention. By the end of
the nineteenth century, a claim was required to define the scope of an invention. The
only portion of the specification that relates to the definition of the invention is the
claims which "define the scope of protection afforded by the patent.... [C]laims are not
technical descriptions of the disclosed inventions but are legal documents like the
descriptions of land by metes and bounds in a deed which define the area conveyed but
do not describe the land."12
The sole objective statutory disclosure requirement of the American patent law is
one for "enablement" which is found in the first part of 35 USC § 112,
1, that "[t]he
specification shall contain a written description of the invention . . . to enable any
person skilled in the art ... to make and use the [invention] .... -13 There is no second
objective disclosure requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 112.
" See infra Part IV (The Biotechnology Deposit Issues).
7 Budapest Treaty on the InternationalRecognition of the Deposit of Microorganismsfor the
Purposes of Patont Procedure,April 28, 1977, 32 U.S.T. 1241, T.I.A.S. No. 9768; see also infra Part V
(Argoudelis: Cornerstone for Global Protection).
8 See infra Part VI (Brake on New Technologies: Et Tu E-Commerce?)
9 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
10 Id.; J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 122 S.Ct. 593, 598 (2001).
11See infra Part VII (Conclusion).
12In re Vamco Mach. & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

The statutory

requirement for precision in claim drafting is codified as 35 U.S.C. § 112,
2. "The specification shall
conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
13The entire wording of this section includes modifiers for enablement as well as the independent
and distinct subjective "best mode contemplated" requirement.
The matters omitted from the
quotation are highlighted and lettering is used to separate the objective and subjective requirements:
"The specification shall contain a written description of the invention [(a)], and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains,or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and [(b)] shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention."
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It is beyond question that an original claim is a part of the specification as filed:
As explained in Myers, "an unamended original claim.., by elementary principles of
patent law [is] to be considered as a part of the original disclosure."14 This principle is
16

15
carried forward in Anderson, and underscored in Rasmussen.

The statutory scheme operates quite well, standing alone, insofar as an original
claim is concerned without a separate "written description" interpretation of § 112.
Because an original claim is a part of the original specification, an original claim by
17
definition should be considered supported by the specification.
But, what happens if the applicant amends his application to provide a claim that
is not a part of the original disclosure? Again, their system took care of this by barring
a new definition lacking antecedent basis by making a "new matter" rejection under 35
U.S.C. § 132.18
The usual method for adding new matter is not through an amendment to the
specification but through the filing of a continuing application.1 9 The claim in the
continuing application is measured against the disclosure in the earlier application: If
it would have been "new matter" to introduce the claim of the continuing application in
the earlier application, then priority was denied.

14 In re Myers, 410 F.2d 420, 427 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
"I In re Anderson, 471 F.2d 1237, 1238-39 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (citing MPEP §§ 706.03(n), 608.01(1));
see also In re Myers, 410 F.2d at 427 ("Claim 1 ... is an unamended original claim in this application
and therefore, by elementary principles of patent law, [is] to be considered as a part of the original
disclosure[.]"); In re Oswald, 83 F.2d 827 (C.C.P.A. 1936).
The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure follows Anderson: "Original claims form part of the
original disclosure and provide their own written description. As such, an application that contains at
least one claim, but does not contain anything which can be construed as a written description of such
claim(s), would be unusual." Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) 601.01(d), at 600-12 (8th
ed. 2001) (citation omitted) [hereinafter MPEP].
1(6In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212, 1214 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1981) ("An original claim is part of the
disclosure at the time of filing."); see also In re Anderson, 471 F.22d at 1238.
17 On occasion, applicants would unsymmetrically draft their patent applications to have a
definition of their invention only in the claims portion of the specification. In such a case, the examiner
was authorized to require an amendment to the specification to copy the definition from the claims and
place the same disclosure in the body of the specification.
Under the procedures set forth in the MPEP, an "objection" is made against the applicant who
fails to provide the redundant definition of the claimed invention in the body of the specification.
MPEP, supra note 15, § 608.01(o), at 600-78. Thus, where the only basis for a new claim is an original
claim, under M.P.E.P. § 608.01(o), "the specification should be objected to for failing to provide proper
antecedent basis for the terminology of the claims. Id., ef In re Marzocchi, 394 F.2d 571 (C.C.P.A.
1968). Then, responsive to this objection, the applicant is free to add the definition from the original
claim into the specification. ExpartePorter, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1144, 1147 n.la (B.P.A.I. 1992).
What the United States should do is simply follow some foreign patent system models that have
the claims at the beginningof the specification; then, there would be no need for such redundancy.
1835 U.S.C. § 132 (2000) ("No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the
invention.").
19There is no point in considering the various labels such as "continuation" or "continuation-inpart," because neither has a statutory basis or any other relevance to the issue at hand. Rather, the
question is simply one of a statutory priority right under 35 U.S.C. § 120. Hence, to avoid unnecessary
confusion, reference is made instead to a "continuing application" that is generic to both.
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B. The 1970 Judicial "Written Description"Requirement
The late Giles Sutherland Rich credited his then-Law Clerk, Ron Havleka, with
1.20
the judicial fabrication of a tripartite set of requirements in 35 U.S.C. § 112,
Instead of that paragraph being home merely to the objective enablement and
subjective best mode requirements, the court invented the "written description"
requirement that it calved from the clumsy wording of the enablement requirement.
The primary motivation of the court in creating the "written description"
requirement was to deal with priority for continuing applications. This came out of the
opinion of Judge Rich that Chapter 12 of the patent law did not provide a basis for
substantive denial of rights, which necessarily meant that "new matter" could not be
2 1
considered for determination of priority.
While inclusion of "new matter" in this chapter may have been a manifestation of
the clumsy nature of the patent law codification, it did not mean that "new matter" or
other traditional grounds of rejection housed in that chapter were suddenly to be
thrown out.
In 1980 in Sasse, the predecessor court judicially threw out a statutory bar under
this chapter on the ground that the chapter is procedural in nature.2 2 Years later,
23
Sasse was dismissed in McGrew.
With the "written description" requirement being set through case law as finding
a statutory home under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
1, now the court had a neat statutory
scheme to deny priority where a claim would have been "new matter" if added to the
parent. 2 4 While that test had stood the test of time dating back to the nineteenth
century, suddenly the court could say that the claimed invention lacked a "written
description" in the parent. Since 35 U.S.C. § 120 requires compliance with 35 U.S.C.
2 5
§ 112, 1, everything now fell into a neat statutory scheme.

20 See CHISUM, supra note 3, at 21.
21 35 U.S.C. §§ 131-35 (2000) (Chapter 12, Examination of Application, has five sections: § 131,
Examination of Application; § 132, Notice of rejection; § 133, Time for Prosecuting Application; § 134,
Appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences; and § 135, Interferences.).
22
1n re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 680 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (Rich, J.).
[W]e do not agree that a substantive bar is raised by [35 USC] § 135(b) in an ex
parte context. The Commentary on the New Patent Act by P. J. Federico is in
accord in stating, "[t]he sections just mentioned, 131 to 135, deal with procedure
in the Patent Office, of which only a small part is reflected in the statute. This
statement complements our decision in In re MeKellin, where § 135(a) was also
found to be procedural in nature.
Id. (citations omitted).
23 In re McGrew, 120 F.3d 1236, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("The Board did not err in refusing to
follow Sasse as 'precedent' because the aspect of that case relied on, being dictum, is not 'precedent'
which we must follow.").
24 The perception of a need for a separate "written description" requirement evolved in the late
1960s. See In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Wakefield, 422 F.2d 897 (C.C.P.A.
1970).
25 Priority is granted for "[a]n application for patent for an invention disclosed in the manner
provided by the first paragraph of section 112 of this title in [the] application previously filed in the
United States." 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000).
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C. 'New Matter"versus "Written Description"
1. Continuation of'New Matter"
The Patent Office continued to adhere to the "new matter" basis for denying a new
or amended claim; it also embraced the "written description" requirement. Now,
instead of rejecting claims on the basis of "new matter" alone, two identical rejections
were often made under both statutory requirements. Typically, a new claim was
"rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112 and § 132 as directed to 'new matter.' ' 26 Never in this
period of coexistence was there any serious thought given to this ground of rejection
being applicable to an originalclaim: It is impossible for something that is a part of the
original application, i.e., an original claim, to be new matter vis-a-vis the original
application.

2. Eliminating 'New Matter"as Redundant
By 1981, the Court decided that it was happy with the statutory framework of
substituting "written description" for "new matter" and saw no need for both grounds.
In Rasmussen the court simply abolished "new matter" as a separate ground of
27
rejection.

3. Original Claims Per Se Support Themselves
The PTO through the early 1990's continued to correctly understand the law of
"new matter" as being carried forward sub nom "written description." In the Porter
case, claims 2 and 3 on appeal were originalclaims that had been finally rejected by the
28
Primary Examiner as lacking a proper "written description" of the invention.
Reversing the Primary Examiner, the Board stated that "slince original claims
constitute part of the original disclosure ....

the ...

rejection of claims 2 and 3 under

29
35 U.S.C. § 112, 1, as lacking descriptive support is clear legal error.
Repudiating this line of reasoning, the panel majority in Enzo states:

Enzo's claims do not meet the written description requirement simply
because they are in ipsis verbis supported by the specification. Even if a
claim is supported by the specification, the language of the claim must
describe the invention so that one skilled in the art can recognize what is
claimed. The appearance of the words of the claim in the specification or as
an original claim does not necessarily satisfy that requirement

....

If a

purported description of an invention does not meet the requirements of the
statute, the fact that it appears as an original claim or in the specification

26 MPEP, supra note 15, § 2163.06, at 2100-172.
27
1n re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
28
Exparte Porter, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1144 (B.P.A.I. 1992).
29
Id.(citing In re Anderson, 471 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
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does not save it. A claim does not become more descriptive by its repetition,
or its longevity.

The written description requirement is the most basic requirement of
the patent law-to adequately identify what one has invented. It is true
that knowledge of one skilled in the art is relevant to meeting that
requirement, as it is to enablement. An invention may be properly enabled
even if some experimentation is required to practice it, provided that
experimentation is not undue. However, to require the public to go to a
public depository and perform experiments to identify an invention is not
consistent with the statutoryrequirement to describe one's invention in the
specification.3 0
It is probably less onerous "to go to a public depository" than it is to try to identify
the nature of some products defined in product-by-process form. The contrasting view
of Circuit Judge Dyk is worth noting:
On the face of it, a specification that describes the invention by
reference to a deposit of a sample of the invention in a recognized depository
is an ideal way of satisfying the written description requirement. The
primary purpose of the statutory written description requirement is to
provide notice to competitors and the public of the scope of the patent
claims. The Supreme Court has stated that
The object of the statute is to require the patentee to describe
his invention so that others may construct and use it after the
expiration of the patent and "to inform the public during the life
of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may
be known which features may be safely used or manufactured
without a license and which may not."
Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47, 57 (1938) (quoting
Permutit Co v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931)). [The Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals] stated that "the 'essential goal' of the description of the
invention requirement is to clearly convey the information that an applicant
has invented the subject matter which is claimed." In re Barker. A
description by reference to the deposited sample provides a precise and
unmistakably clear description of the invention that is accessible to the
31
public.

30

' Enzo, 2002 WL 487156, at *17-'18, *20-*21 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
31 Id.

at *38 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (second citation omitted).
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III.

INVENTIONS WITH LESS THAN A WORD PICTURE

A. An EnablingDisclosureas the Quid Pro Quo
The quidpro quo of the patent system is that in exchange for the grant of a patent
the inventor provides the public with full possession of the means for carrying out the
invention, not a neatly worded description of that invention. Thus, it is simply incorrect
to state that insofar as it is implied that there is a word picture of the invention that
"Ithe written description requirement reflects the quidpro quo of our patent system, in
which an inventor
is only entitled to claim subject matter that is adequately described
32
to the public."
There are numerous situations where the applicant is unable to provide a word
picture, yet the patent system thrives in those areas. If there is a problem in a claim
form presenting difficulties in determination of the scope of protection, the legislature
or the courts can readily devise ways of avoiding the problem. For example, it is
difficult to understand the nature of a product where it is defined as a product-byprocess. But, the court system saw this difficulty and created a claim construction rule
in the BadischeAnilin case to limit infringement to products made by the same process,
even to the point of excluding from infringement the identical product made by a
33
different process.

B. Examination Difficulties
It is a total non sequitur to pose examination problems as a reason for a "written
description" of the invention. There are far more extreme examples where it is
impossible to examine an application at the time of filing with the information at hand
in the file wrapper. For example, it is perfectly proper to incorporate by reference
34
essential elements from a secret document unavailable to the examiner.

1. Statutory Presumptions
The false issue is from time to time raised that somehow a patent examiner will
have undue difficulty because he cannot determine the precise nature of the product. It
has now been over fifty years since Harvey Edelblute's introduction of the deposit
system for patent protection. There has never been any significant criticism of this
32 Id.

at *15 (majority opinion).

Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 310 (1884); accord At1.
Thermoplastics Co., Inc. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1299, 1300 (Rader, J., concurring in the denial of
rehearing in banc) (explaining conflict with earlier panel opinion in Scripps Clinic & Research
Foundation v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991)); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash
Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 374 n.17 (1938) (Reed, J.); Purdue Research Found. v. Watson, 122
U.S.P.Q. 445 (D.D.C. 1958), afCd, 265 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Jon S. Saxe and Julian S. Levitt,
Product-by-Process Claims and Their Current Status in Chemical Patent Office Practice,42 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC'Y 528, 559 (1960).
'
In re Hawkins, 486 F.2d 569, 574-75 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (allowing incorporation of essential
material was incorporated by reference from a secret, foreign patent application).
"33

[1:254 2002]

An Enzo White Paper

system and, indeed, to the contrary, it has been endorsed and globally spread through
the Budapest Treaty.
Any problems where the examiner cannot determine the exact structure of a
product are no different than in other areas. For example, consider the situation where
a product is defined only by reference to its process of manufacture. There, the Patent
examiner has no ability to analyze the product and determine whether it is novel and, if
novel, whether it is sufficiently different to be free from obviousness. Such a case is
simply handled by placing the burden of the patent applicant "to prove that the prior
art products do not necessarily or inherently possess the characteristics of his claimed
35
product.

2. Amendments to the Specification
Often, it becomes possible to better identify the nature of a biotechnology material
as time goes on. This is the norm in biotechnology: The goal is to quickly file for an
invention to nail down patent rights, but then as time goes on the better identification
of the biotechnology material is given to the authorities. This is specifically recognized
in the Budapest Treaty: "Where, in connection with the deposit of a microorganism, the
scientific description and/or taxonomic designation of the microorganism was/were not
indicated, the depositor may later indicate or, where already indicated, may amend
36
such description and/or designation."
The examiner who feels that disclosure incorporated-by-reference should be
embodied directly in the specification does have one remedy: He may make a
requirement for the applicant to physically introduce the secret material into the file
wrapper or even into the specification by amendment.

C. False Statutory Home for Clarity in Claiming
The idea that the claims should provide a written description of the invention is
without foundation in the statute or the case law. It is sufficient that they precisely
define the scope of protection. As explained in Vamco, "claims are not technical
37
descriptions of the disclosed inventions.
Thus, it is entirely the function of the claims to define the scope ofprotection that
is being sought. Imagine a deed to a piece of real property that defines the exact
perimeters of the lot but says nothing about whether square in the center of that lot
there is a beautiful home, a stream, a factory or whatever. Does this make the deed
defective? Obviously not. In the case of patent claims, they "are legal documents like
the descriptions of land by metes and bounds in a deed which define the area conveyed
' 38
but do not describe the land.

'
I re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting In re Fitzgerald, 619 F.2d 67, 70 (C.C.P.A.
1980)); In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
31 Budapest Treaty, Rule 8.1(a), Later Indication or Amendment of the Scientific Description
and/orProposed TaxonomicDesignation.

1n

38_d.

re Vamco Mach. & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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To be sure, fuzzy claiming may present a problem, but it is one of clarity that has
39
nothing to do with the "written description" problem.

D. UnsupportedEmbodiments Within a Genus
Broad claims may in some instances be unwarranted because there is inadequate
teaching of how to make and use some of the varied embodiments. Where there is a
problem, the statutory home is the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1.
Contemporaneously with the refinements of Wakefield40 and Borkowski,4 the
court also recognized in Fisher 2 that claims of the Enzo variety should not be granted.
Fisher presented an Endo-like lack of representative support for a broadly claimed
medicinal invention with limited enablement, certainly insufficient to suggest
possession of the full scope of the subject matter of the claims. Affirming a rejection
under 35 U.S.C. 112,
I under the enablement requirement, the court said:
It is apparent that.., an inventor [with such a broad claim] should be
allowed to dominate the future patentable inventions of others where those
inventions were based in some way on his teachings. Such improvements,
while unobvious from his teachings, are will within his contribution, since
the improvement was made possible by his work. It is equally apparent,
however, that he must not be permitted to achieve this dominance by claims
which are insufficiently supported and hence not in compliance with the
first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. That paragraph requires that the scope
of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement
43
provided by the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art.
Judge Gajarsa also provides an understanding of the scope of enablement rejection
following the same rationale as Fisher. He explains that "[tihe enablement
requirement of § 112 demands that the patent specification enable those skilled in the
art to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue
experimentation. ""'4 Quoting also from Fisher,he notes that:
The enablement requirement ensures that the public knowledge is enriched
by the patent specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope
of the claims. The scope of the claims must be less than or equal to the
scope of the enablement. The scope of enablement, in turn, is that which is

'39The statutory home for a rejection, here, is 35 USC § 112,
2, that has nothing to do with the
'written description" issue.
40 In -reWakefield, 422 F.2d 897 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
41 In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
42 In -reFisher, 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
43Id. at 839.
11 Nat'l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361,
1365 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993)) and citing In -re
Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
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disclosed in the specification plus the scope of what would45be known to one
of ordinary skill in the art without undue experimentation.
While there may very well be problems with the scope of enablement in the facts of
the Enzo case, particularly when one looks to the broader claims that are not limited to
any specific American Type Culture Collection ("ATCC") deposit, 46 the remedy lies in
47
the Fisherlineof cases.

IV. THE BIOTECHNOLOGY DEPOSIT ISSUES

A. The Ad Hoc Domestic Creationof the Practice
More than fifty years ago the late Harvey Edelblute, one of the more brilliant and
creative patent counsel of the era, was faced with an economically important
microorganism that could brew tetracycline but which could not be described in words.
On an ad hoc basis, he created the system of incorporation-by-reference of
microorganism deposits to meet the disclosure requirements of 35 USC § 112,
1,
which were "codified" a generation later in Argoudelis.48 The practice up to Argoudelis

was the subject of a discussion at a Cold Spring Harbor experts' conference a little more
than ten years ago:
The Argoudelis case utilized a deposit with the [Northern Regional
Research Laboratory of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the] NRRL, as
had been the custom since the practice developed on an ad hoc basis roughly
twenty years earlier. The practice may be attributed to the late Harvey
Edelblute, a brilliant corporate staff attorney with American Cyanamid Co.,
who faced the problem of claiming an invention that produced a tetracycline
family drug by "brewing" a certain species of Streptomyces. Edelblute
recognized that there was no way that mere words could teach a worker
skilled in the art how to make a tetracycline drug from his client's
Streptomyces, short of having a sample of the very Streptomyces. From his
scientists, Edelblute learned that the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
through its Northern Regional Research Laboratory in Peoria, Illinois,
maintained samples of microorganisms, assigning "NRRL" numbers and
providing samples to members of the public. It was Edelblute who crafted
45 Nat? Recovery Teehs., 166 F.3d at 1195-96. The quotation continues with a citation of In re
Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1993), for the proposition that "the specification must teach
those of skill in the art 'how to make and how to use the invention as broadly as it is claimed,"' which
cites to Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 496. Also quoted is In re Fisher,427 F.2d at 839, for the proposition that
"[t]he scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided by
the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art."
41 See Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1957 (2001) (explaining how the deposit of biological material may help satisfy
the enablement requirement); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.803(a)(2) (authorizing American Type Culture
Collection (ATCC) as a suitable depository).
47 For purposes of this paper, the specific facts of the case have not been dealt with. It should be
noted, however, that some of the claims are specifically limited to biotechnology deposits.
48
In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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the incorporation-by-reference of the Streptomyces into the patent
application, simply by making a specific reference to the NRRL number in
the patent application. Thus, when the patent was granted, any person
would be able to gain a sample of the Streptomyces from the NRRL, and
through this incorporated-by-reference sample, practice the invention....
The Edelblute practice became an international norm as parallel,
foreign filings were made by American Cyanamid. The dean of the
Japanese patent profession, Shoji Matsui, coordinated the filing,
prosecution and successful enforcement of the Japanese counterpart
patents, creating on an ad hoc basis a framework in Japan for the patenting
of biotechnology inventions based upon NNRL deposits.4 9
The Argoudelispractice is summarized in Lundak:
35 U.S.C. § 112 states that the specification must contain a "written
description" which must "enable" the practice of the invention by others.
The examination for patentability proceeds solely on the basis of the written
description ....

Although a sample is not a written description, Feldman

established that the availability of a sample to the public after the patent
has issued will meet the enablement requirement. On point is In re
Hawkins, 486 F.2d 569, 574 (C.C.P.A. 1973), wherein the court observed
that:
In Argoudelis, we rejected the board's proposition that [35
U.S.C. § 111] requires that the specification must be enabling as
filed. We again reject it. .

.

.

[T]he function of section 112 in

ensuring complete public disclosure is only violated if the
disclosure is not complete at the time it is made public, i.e., at
50
the issue date.
In Amgen v. Ch ugaithere is a further recapitulation of the practice:

49 Wegner, Biotechnology PatentIssues at the Patent Offie, BANBURY RESEARCH CONFERENCE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, Cold Spring Harbor, Long Island, New York, October

10-13, 1991 (citing Argoudels, 434 F.2d at 1392-93; Feldman v. Aunstrup, 517 F.2d 1351 (C.C.P.A.
1975); Albert P. Halluin, Patentingthe Results of Genetic Engineering, An Overview, Banbury Report
10: Patenting of Life Forms, 67, 68 (1982)).
This conference was led by Nobel Laureate James Watson and featured the then-future (1993)
Nobel Laureate Kary B. Mullis. The interesting evolution of his invention ofpolymerase chain reaction
that was explained in greater detail at the Banbury Research Conference is summarized by Emily
Yoffe, Is KaryMullfs God?, ESQUIRE, Vol. 122, No. 1 (July 1, 1994), availablo at 1994 WL 13263352.
A significant representation from both science and the law were present, including the late S.
Leslie Misrock, Dennis Allegretti, and Mullis' counsel, Albert P. Halluin, then Vice-President of Cetus
Corporation who had also participated and helped create the first Banbury Research Conference
dealing with biotechnology ten years previously.
From the Federal appellate judiciary the members present included the Hon. Pauline Newman,
the Hon. Alan D. Lourie, and the late Hon. Giles Sutherland Rich.
"0In -reLundak, 773 F.2d 1216, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted) (second
omission in original).
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For many years, it has been customary for patent applicants to place
microorganism samples in a public depository when such a sample is
necessary to carry out a claimed invention. This practice arose out of the
development of antibiotics, when microorganisms obtained from soil
samples uniquely synthesized antibiotics which could not be readily
prepared chemically or otherwise. In re Argoudelis. Such a deposit has
been considered adequate to satisfy the enablement requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 112, when a written description alone would not place the
invention in the hands of the public and physical possession of a unique
biological material is required. See, e.g., In re Wands ("Where an invention
depends on the use of living materials ... it may be impossible to enable the
public to make the invention (i.e., to obtain these living materials) solely by
means of written disclosure."); In re Lundak ("When an invention relates to
a new biological material, the material may not be reproducible even when
detailed procedures and a complete taxonomic description are included in
the specification."); see generally Hampar, Patenting of Recombinant DNA
Technology: The Deposit Requirement, 67 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y
569, 607 (1985) ("The deposit requirement is a nonstatutory mechanism for
ensuring compliance with the 'enabling' provision under 35 U.S.C. § 112.").51
As explained more recently in Ajinomoto, "[tihe deposit of biological organisms for
public availability satisfies the enablement requirement for materials that are not
amenable to written description or that constitute unique biological materials which
52
can not be duplicated.

B.

Codification of HarveyEdelblute's Practice

Faced with the need of the American biotechnology community to secure
Argoudelis-like protection globally, lengthy efforts to internationally codify the practice
were greeted with success through global adoption of the Budapest Treaty. 53 By 1989,
ol Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Lourie, J.) (citations
omitted).
52 Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(Newman, J.).
53 Guide to the Deposit of Mieroorganisms under the Budapest Treaty, at http://www.wipo.int/
about-ip/en/budapest/guide (last visited April 24, 2002). As explained by the treaty organization
responsible for administration of the Budapest Treaty:

A fundamental requirement of patent law is that the details of an invention must
be fully disclosed to the public. For disclosure to be adequate, an invention must
be described in sufficient detail to permit a person skilled in the art to repeat the
effect of the invention: in other words, the disclosure should enable the average
expert with access to the appropriate facilities to reproduce the invention for
himself. Disclosure is normally achieved by means of a written description
supplemented where necessary by drawings. However, inventions involving the
use of new microorganisms . . . present problems of disclosure in that
repeatability often cannot be ensured by means of a written description alone. ...
[Difficulties in reproducing the invention from the text alone] led to the industrial
property offices in an increasing number of countries either requiring or
recommending that the written disclosure of an invention involving the use of a
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the treaty had been ratified and the PTO codified the practice through formal
rulemaking.
As part of that rulemaking, the Argoudelis practice of incorporation-by-reference of
a biotechnology deposit was codified through a rule stating that "[w]here an invention is
[to] a biological material, the [specification] may include reference to a deposit of such
biological material. '54 It is made explicitly plain that the purpose of the deposit is to
meet the disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1: "Biological material need not
be deposited unless access to such material is necessary for the satisfaction of the
statutory requirements for patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 112."55 It is clear that "[i]f a
deposit is necessary" then making a deposit in accordance with the regulations shall be
accepted: Thus, it is expressly stated that "[the deposit] shall be acceptable if made in
accordance with these regulations." 56 In the Deposit Rules package, the PTO highlights
this point by placing in the "Summary" the statement that "[wihere an invention is or
relies on a biological material which cannot be described in writing alone, and access to
the biological material is necessary to satisfy the statutory requirements for
patentability under 35 U.S.C. 112, these rules prescribe the procedures and conditions
for making a deposit that will satisfy these requirements. ,,57 Underscoring the point, it
is reiterated that
Every patent must contain a written description of the invention sufficient
to enable a person skilled in the art to which the invention pertains to make
and use the invention. Where the invention involves a biological material
and words alone cannot sufficiently describe how to make and use the
invention in a reproducible or repeatable manner, access to the biological
material is necessary for the satisfaction of the statutory requirements for
patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 112.58
It is further stated with specific reference to the relevant rule that: "[37 CFR] §
1.802[(b)] prescribes that biological material need not be deposited unless access to the
material is necessary to satisfy 35 U.S.C. §112. If a deposit is necessary, it shall be
acceptable if made in accordance with these regulations .... 59
In its sectional analysis, the PTO explains Rule 802(b) as follows: "This section
permits a deposit of a biological material to be referenced in a patent application where
an invention is, or relies on, a biological material ....
[Bliological material need not be
deposited unless access to such material is necessary for the satisfaction of the

new microorganism be supplemented by the deposit of the microorganism in a

recognized culture collection.

The culture collection would then make the

microorganism available to the public at the appropriate point in the patenting
procedure.

Id.
14

37 CFR § 1.802(a).

' 37 CFR § 1.802(b).

, 37 CFR § 1.802(b)

(emphasis added).

KDeposit of Biological Materials for Patent Purposes, 54 Fed. Reg. 34864-01 (1989) (final
rulemaking, effective January 1, 1990) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Deposit Rules].
5MId. (Supplementary Information).
,9 Id.

An Enzo White Paper

[1:254 2002]

statutory requirements for patentability under6035 U.S.C. § 112 and that access is not
otherwise available in the absence of a deposit.1
It is also useful to understand the rulemaking that codified the Argoudelispractice
in terms of the customs of the domestic industry of the day. In the 1980's, leading up to
the implementation of Rule 802, it was the common practice of the domestic
biotechnology industry to identify living inventions solely or principally by an
incorporation-by-reference to a deposit, often at the ATCC, that became the norm by
that time, largely replacing what had been Edelblute's Peoria depository, the NRRL.
Thus, a typical claim of that era is: "The E. col ATCC 39052 strain.161 In the context of
a plant patent, the cross-reference was approved in the Solomons and Scamme]] case:
Initially we note that each of the applications contains a written
description of the here claimed subject matter:
"*

*

*

Fusarium

graminearum

Schwabe

deposited

with

Commonwealth Mycological Institute and assigned the numer I.M.I.
145425 * * *
We consider such a "deposit" to adequately describe the invention here
claimed (35 USC 112/162). Our position in this regard appears congruent
with the requirements of 35 USC 112 for an adequate disclosure pertaining
62
to microorganisms.
Also contemporaneous with the codification of the Argoudelis practice through the
new rule, the PTO's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences stated that:

1OId. at 34874-75.
61 U.S. Patent No. 4,666,837 (issued May 19, 1987). This patent names as counsel the author of
the Enzo opinion, as is the case for U.S. Patent No. 4,506,017 (issued Mar. 19, 1985) (Claim 1:
"Pasteurella haemolytica having all of the identifying characteristics of ATCC 31612."); U.S. Patent No.
4,559,306 (issued 1985) (Claim 1: "A biologically pure culture of Pasteurella multocida bacterial having
all of the identifying characteristics of ATCC No. 31610."); U.S. Patent No. 4,694,069 (issued Sept. 15,
1987) (Claim 1: "A biologically pure culture of Kibdelosporangium aridum largum which has the
identifying characteristics of ATCC 39922 ..
"); U.S. Patent No. 4,672,036 (issued June 9, 1987)
(Claim 1: "A biologically pure culture of the microorganism Kibdelosporangium aridum Shearer gen.
nov., sp. nov. ATCC 39323 or an active mutant thereof, said microorganism and mutant being capable
of producing AAD 216A, AAD 216B or AAD 216C in recoverable quantity upon cultivation in aqueous
nutrient medium containing assimilable sources of nitrogen and carbon."); U.S. Patent No. 4,791,064
(issued Dec. 13, 1988) (Claim 1: "Plasmid pS0408, which is naturally present in N. orientalis strain
NRRL 2452, isolated from such strain, or a functional mutant or genetically engineered derivative
thereof wherein said mutant or derivative possesses sufficient amount of the replicon of pS0408 to
permit stable autonomous replication."); U.S. Patent No. 4,293,545 (issued Oct. 6, 1981) (Claim 1: "A
modified live Pasteurella multocida vaccine capable of inducing immunity in bovine, porcine and ovine
animal species without serious side effects comprising a vaccinal amount of modified live Pasteurella
multocida bacteria prepared by chemical modification of virulent Pasteurella multocida strain ATCC
No. 31609 with an acridinium salt, and a carrier therefor."); U.S. Patent No. 4,385,122 (issued May 24,
1983) (Claim 1: "A biologically pure culture of the microorganism Streptosporangium fragile Shearer
sp. nov. ATCC 31519, said culture being capable of producing fragilomycin A in recoverable quantity
upon cultivation in an aqueous nutrient medium containing assimilable sources of nitrogen and
carbon.").
62 ExParte Solomons, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 42, 43 (B.P.A.I. 1978).
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In relevant part, 35 USC § 112, first paragraph, requires the
specification of a patent application to contain a written description of the
invention so as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains to
make and use the claimed invention. In most patent cases, written words
are adequate to satisfy this requirement. However, in patent cases where
biological material plays an integral, necessary role in the claimed subject
matter, written words may not suffice to provide an enabled description of
the invention.
In these cases, a practice has evolved in which the
enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph, may be
complied with by applicant depositing a viable sample of the biological
material involved in the claimed invention in a recognized depository. In
this manner, the public will be in a position to make and use that invention
when a patent is granted as required by this section of the statute upon
63
obtention of a viable sample of deposited material from the depository.

C. No Case Law on the "Written Description , Per Se
All of the biotechnology deposit case law related to the issue of a "written
description" of the manner of making or using an invention and not to a "written
description," per se, in the sense of a word picture to identify the invention. This is
entirely understandable from the case law which evolved under the plain wording of
the statute that there is no separate "written description" requirement or, even after
the Borkowski era, that the "written description" requirement relates only to new
matter.64 But, quite clearly, deposits were routinely incorporated by reference is a
65
primary and sometimes sole means to identify a deposit.

V. ARGOUDELIS-CORNERSTONE FOR GLOBAL PROTECTION

Vital to the American biotechnology industry is the necessity of gaining global
patent rights for their innovations: If patents are lost for the rest of the world, clearly,
the industry is disastrously impacted. But, the entire Argoudelis practice and its global
basis stems from the American example. To the extent that the United States is now to
repudiate Argoudelis, there is nothing to stand in the way of such a highly negative
example spreading throughout the world. If Argoudelis is a humpty-dumpty that falls
globally, it may never be put back together again: It is one thing for the American
biotech industry to go to a sympathetic Congress to restore the necessary practice of
Argoudelis it is yet another thing to imagine doing so in the various global legislatures
which may be less sympathetic to securing a pro-patent environment that may be
locally seen as primarily benefiting Americans-and Japanese and Germans.
1 ExParte Hildebrand, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1662, 1662-63 (B.P.A.I. 1990).
14In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
',Indeed, earlier in this paper there are quotations from claims in eight separate patents from
the 1980's that were procured by the author of the Enzo opinion where the sole or a primary means to
identify the product were by a specific incorporation-by-reference in the claim itself of an ATCC
biotechnology deposit.
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VI. BRAKE ON NEW TECHNOLOGIES: ET Tu E-COMMERCE?
A. A Special Law for Biotechnology
Until the previous decade, there had never been any thought given to suppression
of a new technology by placing a special statutory test to deny patenting. To the
contrary, a highlight of judicial precedent in the latter part of the twentieth century
was the strong signal of the Supreme Court that new technologies are patent-eligible,
7
6
both in biotechnology for life forms in Chakrabarty and in software in Diehrf.
The dissent in Enzo correctly notes that the majority creates a special requirement
for a "written description" unique to biotechnology. The majority "impos[es] a unique
written description requirement in the field of biotechnology, [which] is open to serious
68
question."
New technologies frequently pose problems for both the examiners and the public
to adapt to rapidly evolving new technologies. This is hardly a reason to shut the door
on their patentability. To the contrary, a new technology needs to be fostered, despite
problems such as search and examination difficulties. If it's biotechnology today, will
the court tomorrow impose new statutory proscriptions on e-commerce? On the next
new technology to come along?
Essentially no damage was done to the patent regime by the Borkowski era
creation of a "written description" separate requirement as long as it was limited to
being synonymous with "new matter." A series of panel opinions in the past decade
have created a new law for biotechnology by its expansion of the "written description"
requirement to apply to original claims. In Enzo itself, the author of these earlier
opinions cites these opinions as basis for the new practice:
We have ... previously considered the written description requirement as
applied to certain biotechnology patents, in which a gene material has only
been defined by a statement of function or result and have held that such a
statement did not adequately describe the claimed invention. In Eli Lilly,
we concluded that a claim to a microorganism containing a human insulin
cDNA was not adequately described by a statement that the invention
included human insulin cDNA. The recitation of the term human insulin
cDNA conveyed no distinguishing information about the identity of the
claimed DNA sequence, such as its relevant structural or physical
characteristics. We stated that an adequate written description of genetic
material 'requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula,
chemical name, or physical properties,' not a mere wish or plan for
obtaining the claimed chemical invention." The disclosure must allow one
skilled in the art to visualize or recognize the identity of the subject matter

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
67Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
68 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., No. 01-1230, 2002 WL 487156, at *33 (Fed. Cir. April 2,
2002) (Dyk, J., dissenting).
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of the claim. A description of what the genetic material does, rather than of
69
what it is, does not suffice.

B. No Case is Made for a Special Rule
More than fifty years have passed since Harvey Edelblute took his Streptomyces
strain to Peoria. A generation has elapsed since the triumph of the American
government to gain enactment of the Budapest Treaty. More than a decade has passed
since the domestic rulemaking codification of Budapest as satisfying the requirements
of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1. Biotechnology has thrived. Careful examination of the majority
opinion in Enzo shows no special need for the judicial legislation embodied in that case
and the earlier cases from the previous decade.

1. Quid Pro Quo to the Public
The Enzo majority without citation of authority boldly states that "[t]he written
description requirement reflects the quid pro quo of our patent system, in which an
inventor is only entitled to claim subject matter that is adequately described to the
public. ' 70 As discussed earlier in this paper, this has never a key point of the law.
There is no more ambiguity about the nature of a product pinpointed to a specific
biotechnology deposit than by a more general product-by-process description. In either
case, the reader of the patent will not know, absent a lot of work, precisely what the
structure of the product may be.
Judicial safeguards to protect the public are readily made. For example, in the
area of the very indefinite product-by-process language where it is often impossible to
tell precisely what product is made, it would be unfair to permit a patentee to sue
parties who have made a product by a different method which may or may not be the
same or equivalent. Therefore, dating back to the nineteenth century, the Supreme
Court has held that third parties need not figure out the nature of the final product: As
long as they make their product by a different method, then they will be free from a
finding of infringement even if it later turns out that the identicalproduct is produced
by this different method.

2. False Burdens on the Examiner
The majority complains that use of a deposit makes examination difficult. But,
again using product-by-process claims as an example, applicants are further
discouraged from use of the product-by-process form by the judicial doctrines that place
a very heavy burden on the patent applicant to prove that his product is both different
and unobvious versus prior art structures, even if made by a different method.

139
Id.at * 11 (majority opinion).
70 Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
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3. Broad Claims That Are Not Enabled
The majority makes a false point by stressing the breadth of claim 1 and other
claims that are not restricted to a deposit number. Certainly, there are problems that
may arise where there is a limited scope of enablement. But, there is a statutory
scheme already in place to deal with this problem.

C. Playing by the Rules of Practice (in PatentCases)
The Enzo majority is dismissive of the ad hoc practice, stating that the court is free
to disregard published guidelines such as in the Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure ("MPEP");7 1 it ignores the court's own precedent that patent applicants have
a right to rely upon the procedures set forth in the MPEP. 72 Much more serious is the
fact that beyond such guidance an entire global framework was built upon this ad hoc
practice into the Budapest Treaty. Furthermore, the practice in the MPEP and the
Budapest Treaty was codified in the form of formal rules that have been in force since
1990.

VII. CONCLUSION
While the damage wrought by Enzo may be minimized for domestic biotechnology
through appropriate Congressional action, it often takes many years to correct what
seems to be so obvious a problem, and when Congress does act, the numerous
competing interests far too often create a muddied compromise that often creates more
problems than there had been before.

A. Teaching Foreign Governments How to Kill Biotech
Where Enzo will do its greatest damage in the short range will be in the
international patent arena where even developed countries take a serious look at
whatever major policy changes are made, particularly in the high technology areas
where American intellectual property protection is seen as a boon to its expansion. If
something is good for America in this area, it may well be adopted in developed
countries. A fortiori,if a developing country wants to put the brakes on the local patent
system, to gum up the works to make it impossible for American biotechnology concerns
to gain the broad protection they need overseas to share the immense costs of
development of the new generation of biotechnology products, what better sand in the
71 Id.
at *5 ("[T]he Guidelines [for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 'Written
Description' Requirement], like the MPEP, are not binding on this court.") (citing Molins PLC v.
Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1180 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that the MPEP is not binding on this
court but is "entitled to judicial notice as an official interpretation of statutes or regulations as long as
it is not in conflict therewith")).
72 But, it is well settled that the MPEP may be relied upon by patent applicants where there is no

conflicting statutory standard. See Ethicon v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (following In
-reKaghan, 387 F.2d 398, 401 (C.C.P.A. 1967)).
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gears is possible than a statutory Enzo adoption in local law. On what basis can the
U.S. Trade Representative use the TRIPs to attack an onerous provision in an
developing nation's law that is taken straight from Madison Place?

B. The Futureof the Next New Technology
The genius of the American patent system has been its flexible accommodation of
any "new manufactures '73 that come along. Blessed by the positive imprimatur of
Chakrabartyand Diehr,and the continued green light to patent-eligiblity expressed in
the most recent term in the J.E.M reaffirmation of Chakrabarty,the Supreme Court
has signaled Wall Street and the developers of new technologies that the patent water
is fine. Jump in the pool. Develop your new technologies. Certainly, every new
technology has difficulties for claiming and examination and understanding by the
public. Indeed, there have been impressive patent litigations in the past generation
that have drawn great attention to problems in our system. So, too, have we seen
problems in the area of e-commerce and business patents. But, macroscopically looking
at the picture, nobody can serious argue that American society would be better off
without a strong and healthy development of these new technologies.
To judicially legislate difficult, if not impossible, barriers to the evolution of new
technologies today creates a negative precedent for the next "better light bulb" to come
down the pike in the coming years.

C. Chakrabarty: The OngoingMessage from the Court
The philosophy of an open door to patentability of new manufactures in
Chakrabarty should be sustained and fueled, as it was so recently by the Federal
Circuit in AT&Tin the context of patent-eligibility: "[Tihis court * * * has struggled to
make our understanding of the scope of [35 U.S.C.] § 101 responsive to the needs of the
modern world. '74 Even more powerfully and in its current term, the Supreme Court
has underscored the continued vitality of Chakrabartyinthe J.E.M case:
As this Court recognized over 20 years ago in Chakrabarty,the language of
§ 101 is extremely broad. "In choosing such expansive terms as
'manufacture' and 'composition of matter,' modified by the comprehensive
'any,' Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given
7 "New manufactures" represents the terminology from the English parent patent statutes and
was presented by the author in various writings in the 1970's that were considered in the Borgy case.
In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 974 n.10 (C.C.P.A. 1979), affdsub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.

303 (1980) ("See Wegner, The Patentabity of 'NowManufactures' The Living Invention, 'Now
Manufactures' Encouragementof PioneerResearch,' 1978 Patent Law Conference Coursebook (BNA)
253-62.) (Mr. Wegner has extensively researched the question while a fellow at the Max Planck
Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright, and Competition Law, Munich, Germany.

See Wegner, Patent Protection for Novel Microorganisms Useful for the Preparationof Known
Products, 5 Int'l Rev.Indus.Prop. & Copyright L. 285 (1974); Wegner, Patenting Nature's Secrets

Microorganisms,7 Int'l Rev.Indus.Prop. & Copyright L. 235 (1976).").
71AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Plager, J.)

(citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)).

[1:254 2002]

An Enzo White Paper

wide scope." This Court thus concluded in Chakrabartythat living things
were patentable under § 101, and held that a manmade micro-organism fell
within the scope of the statute. As Congress recognized, "the relevant
distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between
75
products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions.
In Chakrabarty,the Court also rejected the argument that Congress must
expressly authorize protection for new patentable subject matter:
It is, of course, correct that Congress, not the courts, must define
the limits of patentability; but it is equally true that once Congress has
spoken it is "the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is." Marbury v. Madison. Congress has performed its
constitutional role in defining patentable subject matter in § 101; we
perform ours in Construing the language Congress has employed....
The subject-matter provisions of the patent law have been cast in broad
terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting "the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts" with all that means for the
76
social and economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson.
Whither goes the court? Is the Chakrabartyphilosophy that was followed almost
immediate for computer software in Diehr and a generation later in J.E.M to be
followed? What lessons are we to provide the rest of the world on the protection of new
technologies through local patent systems?

75 J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 593, 598 (2001).

71Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980).

